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OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTING, ABORIGINAL COST, 
AND POOLING OF INTERESTS 
ACCOUNTING
Abstract: Through the years, pooling of interest accounting was 
criticized as contrary to the decision usefulness objective of financial 
reporting and potentially misleading to stockholders and creditors, 
the assumed principal users of financial reports. This paper does not 
dispute those criticisms. It demonstrates, however, that there were 
some very good reasons for permitting pooling accounting for certain 
business combinations when the method was developed in the 1940s. 
At that time, the basic objectives of financial accounting encompassed 
stewardship and decision usefulness for multiple users, including 
public utility regulators and public policy makers. Pooling account­
ing developed in part to satisfy the information needs of public utility 
regulators who favored aboriginal (original historical) cost to deter­
mine the utility rate base; additionally, it was favored by public policy 
makers who sought lower utility rates (prices) to foster social and 
economic goals.
INTRODUCTION
Most academic and practicing accountants are fam iliar 
with the recent theory controversy over the financial report­
ing of business combinations. A m ajor part of this controversy 
centered on whether to continue to require or permit pooling o f
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interests accounting under Accounting Principles Board [APB] 
Opinion No. 16, “Business Combinations” [APB 16, 1970] for 
business combinations brought about by exchanges of common 
stock. Pooling accounting was criticized as contrary to more 
basic accounting concepts [see, e.g., Wyatt, 1963, pp. 92-95, 
105; Kam 1990, p. 379] and/or potentially misleading to external 
financial report users such as stockholders and creditors [see, 
e.g., Seligman, 1982, p. 420] and/or contrary to the stewardship 
and/or decision usefulness objectives of financial reporting [see, 
e.g., Martinez-Jerez, 2008, p. 6]. Among other defects, critics of 
pooling accounting [see, e.g., Briloff, 1967, pp. 490-495; Lintner, 
1971, pp. 106-107; and Davis, 1990, p. 104] noted that it grossly 
understated (1) the cost of such combinations; (2) the carrying 
values of acquiree net assets at the combination date; and (3) 
the expenses from using up those net assets subsequent to the 
combination date.1 The controversy was largely resolved in the 
United States by Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 141, “Business Combinations” [SFAS-141, 2001],2 and in­
ternationally by International Financial Reporting Standard No.
3, “Business Combinations” [IFRS-3, 2004], which prohibited 
pooling accounting and required purchase accounting for all 
business combinations.3 For convenience, the subsequent dis­
cussion of accounting standards is in terms of U.S. GAAP.
This paper does not dispute these aforementioned criti­
cisms of pooling accounting. Rather, it demonstrates that, from 
a historical perspective, there were some very good reasons for 
requiring or at least permitting pooling accounting for stock-for- 
stock combinations of public utility companies when the m eth­
od was developed in the 1940s. At that time, the basic objectives 
of financial accounting were viewed more broadly than now to
1 Of course, corporate management of unregulated industries and their pro­
moters often favored pooling accounting for these very reasons; it usually report­
ed stock-for-stock combinations at lower book values rather than at higher fair 
values, thereby resulting in reporting lower expenses and higher earnings after 
the combination.
2 Somewhat inconsistently, shortly after prohibiting pooling accounting for 
business combinations, the FASB prescribed a similar accounting method for 
certain combinations of not-for-profit organizations. However, the FASB refers 
to this prescribed accounting method as the carryover method, not the pooling 
method. See SFAS 164, 2009, paras. 6-7, in ASC Section 956-810-20.
3 To harmonize terminology internationally and reflect some more recent 
changes in the way combinations are recorded, purchase accounting is now called 
the acquisition method. See Financial Accounting Standards Statement No. 141 
(Revised), “Business Combinations” [SFAS 141(R), 2007a], in FASB Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) Section 805.
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include providing information to a set of unknown users with 
multiple needs, not just stockholders and creditors; importantly, 
the basic objectives of financial accounting included providing 
information for rate making by utility regulators and for foster­
ing certain social and economic goals by public policy makers. 
In the 1940s, some of the above enum erated defects of pooling 
accounting were viewed as strengths, at least by utility regula­
tors and public policy makers.
More specifically, because it reported stock-for-stock com­
binations at historical cost book values rather than at usually 
higher fair values, pooling accounting conformed to the concept 
of aboriginal (or original historical) cost and prudent invest­
m ent theory in utility regulation. As a result, it usually resulted 
in lower utility rate bases; in turn, the lower rate bases resulted 
in lower utility rates (prices), which were viewed as consis­
tent with social and economic policies of encouraging more 
widespread use of electricity to facilitate economic growth and 
enhance living standards of the masses. The rem ainder of this 
paper is organized in the following sections:
(a) Overview of tax and financial accounting for stock- 
for-stock combinations
(b) Rate making information needs of regulatory authori­
ties
(c) Rationale of aboriginal cost for regulatory purposes
(d) Rationale of pooling accounting for regulatory pur­
poses
(e) Changing perceptions of objectives of financial report­
ing
(f) Summary and conclusion
(g) Addendum: Recent combinations of health care orga­
nizations
OVERVIEW OF TAX AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR 
STOCK-FOR-STOCK BUSINESS COMBINATIONS
Section 368 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) deals 
with business combinations, which it refers to as corporate 
reorganizations. Turn ier [1976, p. 911] notes that since 1918, 
the IRC provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on stock or 
securities received incident to nontaxable corporate reorganiza­
tions; since 1924, the IRC provides for carryover basis, whereby 
the tax basis of the old stock or securities becomes the tax basis 
of the new stock or securities in nontaxable corporate reorgani­
3
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zations.4 Section 368 includes detailed tests as to what qualifies 
as a nontaxable corporate reorganization. Under Section 368, 
m any if not most stock-for-stock business com binations are 
nontaxable corporate reorganizations, with the acquirees tax 
basis of the stock or net identifiable assets carried over to the 
acquirer.
Until the 1940s, all business combinations, including non­
taxable stock-for-stock business com binations, were subject 
to purchase accounting for financial reporting purposes. As a 
result, the acquirer reported the identifiable net assets of the 
acquiree at fair value for financial reporting purposes, with the 
residual reported as goodwill.5 On the other hand, nontaxable 
stock-for-stock business combinations were subject to carryover 
basis for tax purposes. Sapienza [1962, pp. 277-278] suggests 
that pooling accounting is merely an adaption of the tax treat­
m ent of nontaxable business combinations for financial report­
ing purposes:
If a combination is accounted for tax-wise in one m an­
ner, namely [with carryover basis] as [a] pooling, and as 
a purchase in financial reports, pressure to create an ac­
counting method to conform to the tax law arises. The 
concept of pooling is the natural outgrowth.... It is the 
authors [Sapienza's] view that the pooling concept in 
accounting ... results, in part, from tax law. The pooling
4Turnier [1976, p. 911] suggests that Congress granted nonrecognition of gain 
or loss for qualifying reorganizations principally from "... a desire not to discour­
age economic restructurings which otherwise would have occurred in the course 
of the orderly evolution of the nation’s economy.” He [1976, p. 911] notes that 
from 1921 to 1924, the Code inadvertently permitted basis step up even though it 
permitted nonrecognition of gain or loss.
5 Until 1953, acquirers could write off goodwill immediately against addition­
al paid-in capital for financial reporting purposes. Additionally, until 1953, some 
acquirers reported some or all of the difference between the book value and the 
fair value of the acquiree as goodwill when it was impracticable to allocate that 
difference to individual identifiable tangible and intangible net assets, with just 
the residual reported as goodwill. See Wyatt, 1963, pp. 30, 38-39. (However, this 
practice was presumably more common for unregulated than for regulated com ­
panies, because regulated companies made every effort to allocate the difference 
in order to obtain a stepped up rate base.) Until 1970, acquirers could choose not 
to amortize unimpaired goodwill. See APB 17, 1970, para. 14. As a result, post­
combination net income might be almost the same under purchase and pooling 
accounting. (Again, however, this result was more common for unregulated than 
for regulated companies.) Until 2001, some acquirers reported some or all of the 
difference between the book values and the fair values of acquiree identifiable 
intangible assets as goodwill rather than allocated those differences to individu­
al identifiable intangible assets, with just the residual reported as goodwill. See 
SFAS 141, 2001, para. B162-B164.
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concept allows parallel treatm ent in tax and financial 
reports, in accounting for business combinations.
The next section of this paper discusses the rate making 
information needs of public utility regulatory authorities. The 
heart of the paper is the following two sections that discuss, 
respectively, the rationale of aboriginal cost for utility regulatory 
purposes, and how pooling accounting developed as a logical 
outgrowth of the increasing use of aboriginal cost for regulatory 
purposes. The next section considers the changing perceptions 
of the objectives of financial reporting, followed by a summary 
and conclusion section. An addendum  discusses how pooling 
accounting might enter into the debate as to the reasonableness 
of third-party reim bursem ent rates following combinations of 
health care organizations.
RATE MAKING INFORMATION NEEDS OF REGULATORY 
AUTHORITIES6
Rowe and Anderson [1993, p. 7] note that in the late 
nineteenth century, state legislatures across the United States 
imposed regulation over the then rapidly developing electric 
utility industry. State legislatures understood that a utility was a 
natural monopoly—i.e., because of economies of scale, the cost 
of service is lower with a single provider than with several utility 
companies competing with one another.7 Rowe and Anderson 
[1993, p. 7] refer to a “regulatory compact” that state legisla­
6 Some public utilities are subject only to state regulation, others only to 
federal regulation, and still others to state and federal regulation. As a result, 
there have been numerous rate making decisions by state and federal regulatory 
authorities since the 1880s. Many of these decisions were subsequently argued 
before state or federal courts; and many decisions of regulatory authorities and 
lower level state and federal courts were supported or overturned by higher level 
courts and ultimately by the U.S. Supreme Court. An extensive literature summa­
rizes these cases. See, e.g., Baur, 1944; Carpenter, 1950; Joslin and Miller, 1957; 
Hearth et al., 1988. This paper emphasizes the decisions of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), formerly the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 
and the U.S. Supreme Court.
7 At least since the 1970s if not before, some of these natural monopoly posi­
tions were lessened due to changing technology and economics. For example, 
presently two or more electric utility companies may compete to provide electric 
power over the same transmission lines, and interstate trucking competes more 
effectively with railroads than heretofore. As a result, regulators and legislators 
saw a reduced need to protect the public from the potential abuse of the mo­
nopoly positions of utilities, and the extent of regulation has been reduced. For 
example, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 reduced the extent of federal regulation of railroads.
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tures established to impose responsibilities on both the utilities 
and the state:
Utilities were obliged to provide universal, adequate 
service and submit themselves to rate and service regu­
lation so customers would be protected from the abuses 
of monopoly power (high prices and poor service). 
States agreed to afford companies an opportunity to 
earn a reasonable return on prudent investments. Regu­
lation was imposed as a substitute for competition.
Federal regulation of natural monopolies started at about 
the same time. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887 established the Interstate Commerce Commission to regu­
late railroads. Other natural monopolies ultimately subject to 
state and/or federal regulation include natural gas, water, street 
cars, bus lines, trucking, and airlines.
Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1035-1036] note that the basic 
theory of regulation focuses on setting utility rates at a level 
sufficient to give the utility a “reasonable" rate of return on its 
investment. If the rate is set too low, it is deemed to be “con­
fiscatory,” to involve a “taking of private property for public 
use without just compensation,” and is a violation of the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Leventhal [1965, 
p. 995] adds that as a result of the 1944 Hope Natural Gas case,8 
another concern of utility regulation is making sure that the rate 
of return is sufficient for a utility to accumulate and attract the 
capital needed for the maintenance and growth of productive as­
sets to satisfy the publics demand for service.9 Bernstein [1937, 
p. 129] elaborates that rate making “...should also be sufficiently 
responsive to changing economic conditions to prevent an un­
desirable divergence of utility rates from the costs of producing 
utility services.”
Rate setting involves fixing the selling price of the services 
provided by the utility, which directly affects the am ount of rev­
enues, and determining the allowable expenses to be deducted
8Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 
(1944). See also 320 U.S. 591; 64 S. Ct. 281; 88 L. Ed. 333; 1944 U.S. Lexis 1204.
9 Interestingly, Leventhal [1965, p. 995] notes that as a result of the Hope 
case, "... the leading cases suggest that the primary legal standard offered by the 
[U.S. Supreme] Court is the standard of comparable earnings. This standard, too, 
aims at attracting and holding capital, but it alone permits direct examination of 
the ratio between the earnings of a utility and its net worth in comparison with 
that ratio in companies of similar risk.” However, the measurement of net worth 
remains controversial, with different regulatory authorities favoring aboriginal 
cost, prudent investment, and fair value. See also Sparrow, 1965, p. B329.
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
Nurnberg, Pooling 51
from revenues to derive the income or return. Rate making 
requires guidelines to measure the income or return, which is 
the numerator, and the investment or rate base, which is the de­
nominator, and then ascertaining w hether the resulting rate of 
return on investment is reasonable.10
According to Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048], public utili­
ties traditionally argue that ownership of property includes the 
right to earn a return on it; that this return, since it is regulated 
by the state, has to be a “fair” return on the “fair value” of the 
property; and that unless a utility is afforded the opportunity 
to earn a fair rate of return on the fair value of the property, the 
property is being confiscated without due process, comparable 
to the state appropriating physical assets without payment of 
just compensation.
In Smyth v. Ames (1898), the U.S. Supreme Court pre­
scribed use of fair value of utility property to measure the rate 
base.11 Requiring use of fair value to measure the rate base was 
reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in several subsequent 
cases until the early 1940s. For example, in the 1923 Southwest­
ern Bell Telephone Company case,12 the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed a state supreme courts order and held that the rate 
base should reflect the [fair] value of the property at the time the 
rates were set, not the original cost, thereby reaffirming Smyth 
v. Ames; because the property had increased in value, the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that Southwestern Bell was entitled 
to rates that reflected the benefit of the increase.
Initially, the fair value of the property was estimated as the 
present value of the estimated fair return on the property. Joslin 
and Miller [1957, pp. 1048-1049, fn. 62] and others note the cir­
10This paper is concerned principally with showing how pooling accounting 
evolved as a way to facilitate the increasing use of aboriginal cost valuations of 
the rate base—i.e., the denominator of the rate of return calculation. Of course, 
the valuation of utility assets in the rate base at aboriginal cost rather than at fair 
value subsequently affects the measurement of depreciation expense and income 
(return)—i.e., the numerator—of the rate of return calculation. This paper em­
phasizes the measurement of the denominator—the rate base—not the income 
numerator.
11Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47, modified on rehearing, 171 U.S. 361 
(1898), as cited by Joslin and Miller, 1957, p. 1030, fn. 11. “The basis of all calcula­
tions as to the reasonableness of rates ... must be the fair value of property being 
used by it [the utility] for the convenience of the public.”
12See State of Missouri Ex Rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Pub­
lic Service Commission of Missouri, Et Al., No. 158., Supreme Court of the United 
States, 262 U.S. 276; 43 S. Ct. 544; 67 L. Ed. 981; 1923 U.S. Lexis 2642; 31 A.L.R. 
807.
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cularity inherent in arguing that a utility has the right to earn a 
fair rate of return on the fair value of its property m easured this 
way, because the fair value of property reflects the earnings that 
can be obtained from its use. Utilities overcame this circular­
ity by using estimated reproduction cost of existing property to 
approximate its fair value. However, Smith [1946, p. 295] notes 
that estimated reproduction cost of existing property is a poor 
measure of its fair value because most existing utility property 
would not be replaced with the same property due to technologi­
cal improvements; rather, it would be replaced, usually at lower 
cost, with more efficient property. Additionally, the process of 
estimating reproduction cost was extremely expensive and time 
consuming, as was the process of arguing before regulatory 
authorities and courts as to the reasonableness of estimates of 
reproduction cost to measure the rate base.13
More important, in the Hope Natural Gas Case,14 the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
and held that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) is perm it­
ted [but not required] to use historical cost to measure the rate 
base.15 However, Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048] note that "... 
rate base/rate of return is still the dom inant concept in rate reg­
ulation.... Rate making is still, despite the end-result language in 
Hope, a ‘fair return' on a rate base.”
Therefore, the issue comes down to the valuation of utility 
property in the rate base. Traditionally, utilities seeking higher
13See Smith [1946, p. 295], Smith [1946, p. 295] notes that “... probably 300 
man-years were required by the company and the Wisconsin Commission to 
make a [reproduction cost] valuation of the Wisconsin Telephone Company. The 
Ohio Bell Telephone Company case was in process fourteen years, the New York 
Telephone case a like period of time, and the Illinois Bell Telephone case twelve 
years. He [1946, p. 295] describes this attempt to determine fair value by using 
reproduction cost of existing property as "... probably the greatest hoax ever per­
petrated on the American consuming public.” Earlier, Healy [1938, p. 6] criticized 
reproduction cost for similar reasons: “When one realizes the complexities and 
antipathies which reproduction appraisals have engendered in the field of rate 
regulation, one regrets its use in balance sheets. It is based on a misapplication 
of the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. Its principal products will be confusion and 
deception.”
14Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 
(1944). See also 320 U.S. 591; 64 S. Ct. 281; 88 L. Ed. 333; 1944 U.S. Lexis 1204. 
See also Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048].
15As a result of the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, various 
energy-related federal agencies were consolidated into a newly-formed Depart­
ment of Energy (DOE). The FPC (FPC) was retained as a separate independent 
regulatory body within the DOE; however, it was renamed the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
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rates favor valuation at fair value whenever it is higher than 
aboriginal cost, with fair value estimated as present value of 
estimated earnings, or as estimated reproduction cost of existing 
property. On the other hand, consum er advocates seeking lower 
rates traditionally favor valuation at aboriginal cost, which is 
usually lower than fair value.16
In addition, when reviewing a request to recover an invest­
ment in utility assets through inclusion in the rate base, regula­
tors traditionally rely on two tests: (1) the prudent investment 
test, and (2) the used and useful test. According to Hearth et al. 
[1988, pp. 16-17], under the prudent investment test, if regula­
tors conclude that a utility made an im prudent investment in 
utility assets based on then available information, some or all of 
that investment may not be recoverable by inclusion in the rate 
base.17 The used and useful test asks w hether the investment will
16Brundage [1950, p. 388] notes a reversal of positions in the fair value versus 
aboriginal cost debate to measure the rate base: “[T]he relatively high initial cost 
of the transcontinental railroads and the decline in the general price level during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century led the shippers [as consumers] and the 
regulatory commissions during that period to take the position that the railroads 
[and other utilities] were not entitled to a fair return on original cost but only on 
the then present [fair] value of the property....The Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames 
upheld this view in 1898. Since the turn of the [twentieth] century, however, the 
price trend has been upward and the commissions, changing their position, have 
tried to hold the utilities down to actual cost. At the same time the railroads natu­
rally switched their position and insisted on the higher replacement values [or 
fair] values. The Supreme Court continued to hold to its position in Smyth v. Ames 
[until 1944]....” See also Home [1942, p. 252].
17Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] add that by satisfying the prudent investment test, 
a utility can usually recover some or all of the sunk costs of a canceled plant but 
not necessarily a return on that sunk cost. They [1988, p. 17] cite the New England 
Power Company case, which was upheld by the federal courts, where the Fed­
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruled that investors and ratepayers 
jointly share the risks and potential benefits from constructing new plants, hence 
should share in the costs of plant that is canceled before completion; however, 
the utility should not earn a return on that sunk cost, even if the utility acted 
prudently. See New England Power Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com­
mission, 668 F. 2nd 1327 (1981).
On the other hand, in several states, utilities were denied any recovery of sunk 
costs of cancelled plants. For example, Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that the 
Ohio Supreme Court overturned an Ohio Public Utilities Commission ruling that 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company was entitled to recover the sunk costs of 
three cancelled nuclear power plants. The Ohio commission reached its decision 
by applying both the prudent investment test and the used and useful test, and also 
argued that its decision was consistent with the vast majority of decisions in other 
jurisdictions. However, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held 
that, under Ohio law, all sunk costs of canceled investment were extraordinary 
losses and not recoverable. Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that the Ohio Supreme
9
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be used by the rate paying public, and will it be useful to them. 
If used and useful, the utility is allowed to recover its invest­
ment; if not used and useful, the utility is not allowed to recover 
that investment.18
Notwithstanding prudence in the decision to invest, Priest 
[1966, p. 307, italics added] notes that “[l]oss of value arising 
out of deflation, or obsolescence, or changed economic condi­
tions, will inevitably be recognized for the purpose of making 
utility rates.” For example, in the Market Street Railway case,19 
the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the California 
Railroad Commission to set the rate base of a San Francisco 
street railway company at $7,950,000—the price that company 
offered the property for sale to the city—although its book 
value was $41,768,505 and its estimated reproduction cost was 
$25,000,000, and noted the following:
... it may be safely generalized that the due process 
clause never has been held by this Court to require a 
commission to fix rates on the present reproduction 
value of something no one would presently want to 
reproduce, or on the historical valuation of a property 
whose history and current financial statements showed 
the value no longer to exist, or on an investment after it
Court reaffirmed its decision in three subsequent cases. See also Market Street 
Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California ET AL. Nos. 510, 511, Supreme 
Court of the United States, 324 U.S. 548; 65 S. Ct. 770; 89 L. Ed. 1171; 1945 U.S. 
LEXIS 2625, February 26, 1945, Argued, March 26, 1945, Decided.
18 Utility plant may satisfy the used and useful test without being currently in 
use, sometimes without ever being in use. For example, Priest [1966, p. 310] notes 
that a vintage electric generating plant that is less efficient than m odem plants 
will be included in the rate base if it is being maintained in condition as a standby 
reserve and is being used from time to time. Such a plant will not be included in 
the rate base, however, if it is not being properly maintained and has not produced 
electricity over a lengthy period.
In other situations, utility plant may satisfy the used and useful test without 
ever being in use. For example, Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that many regula­
tory bodies have used the used and useful test in allowing utilities to recover the 
sunk costs of cancelled nuclear generating plants that, by definition, is never used 
by the rate paying public. But they [1988, p. 17] also note that in applying the 
prudent investment and used and useful tests, regulators usually examine three 
decisions: (1) to begin construction; (2) to incur costs during construction; and (3) 
to cancel the plant. According to Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17], regulators occasion­
ally conclude that utilities waited too long before canceling plants and prohibit 
recovery of sunk costs incurred beyond some earlier date.
19Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California ET AL. 
Nos. 510, 511, Supreme Court of the United States, 324 U.S. 548; 65 S. Ct. 770; 89 
L. Ed. 1171; 1945 U.S. LEXIS 2625, February 26, 1945, Argued, March 26, 1945, 
Decided.
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has vanished, even if  once prudently made, or to m ain­
tain the credit of a concern whose securities already 
are impaired. The due process clause has been applied to 
prevent governmental destruction o f  existing economic 
values. It has not and cannot be applied to insure values 
or to restore values that have been lost by the operation o f  
economic forces.
Accordingly, under the prudent investment test and the used 
and useful test, investment might be measured at some estimate 
of fair value, aboriginal cost, or some adjusted historical cost.
RATIONALE OF ABORIGINAL COST FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES
Stickney et al. [2010, p. 835] define aboriginal cost in public 
utility accounting as "... the acquisition cost of an asset incurred 
by the first entity devoting that asset to public use.” They [2010, 
p. 835] note that “[i]f regulators used a different cost basis, 
public utilities could exchange assets among themselves at ever- 
increasing prices in order to raise the rate base,” which would 
be followed by raising the regulated prices based on that rate 
base.20
Closely related to the concept of aboriginal cost and the 
prudent investment test is using prudent investment theory to 
measure the rate base. As expounded in his famous dissent 
in the 1923 Southwestern Bell case, U.S. Supreme Court Jus­
tice Louis Brandeis argued that what the investor devotes to 
the public use (and for which s/he is entitled to a fair return 
thereon) is not specific property, whose value fluctuates due to 
changing prices but diminishes due to depreciation; rather, Jus­
tice Brandeis favored using the objectively ascertainable am ount 
of invested capital to measure the rate base, usually measured 
at aboriginal cost [see also Carpenter, 1950, pp. 374-75; and 
Uroksky, 2009, pp. 611-614]. According to Brandeis’ prudent 
investment theory, the investor is entitled to receive a return on 
the am ount of capital prudently invested in the utility enterprise, 
and no more. Such a rate base would be definite, permanent, 
and high enough to yield the investor an adequate return, w ith­
out allowing the investor to reap profits on money s/he never 
invested. However, as Carpenter [1950, p. 375] notes, despite the
20Bonbright [1945, p. 444] notes that "... despite all attempts to ridicule an 
original-cost rate base by calling it ‘aboriginal cost,’ or other funny names, such 
a rate base is required as a general rule by the logic of the prudent investment 
principle.”
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cogency of Brandeis’ arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not sanction use of aboriginal cost or the prudent investment 
theory to measure the rate base until the 1944 Hope Natural Gas 
case.21
Bonbright [1945, p. 442] distinguishes the fair value stan­
dard from the concept of aboriginal cost under the prudent 
investment theory as follows:
The “fair value” standard undertakes to make the rate 
base depend on the value of the utility property at the 
time when the rates are being fixed, however m uch 
this value may deviate either from original construc­
tion cost or from actual cost to the present owner. The 
“prudent investment” standard, on the other hand, uses 
as its criterion not the value but rather the cost of the 
property devoted to the public service so long as this 
cost may be deemed to have been prudently incurred.
For public utility rate making purposes, the prudent invest­
m ent theory implies that a fair return is allowed only on prudent 
investments in utility property. As Bonbright notes [1945, pp. 
442-443, italics added], “[o]rdinarily, the relevant cost is the 
cost of constructing the properties used and useful in the public 
service, and this cost, save in a somewhat unusual case, means 
the same thing as the cost o f the property when first devoted to the 
public service so long as this cost may be deemed to have been 
prudently incurred.”
However, public utilities argue that whenever utility prop­
erty has been transferred to another company at a price in
21 There have been many different ways of applying the prudent investment 
theory. For example, Carpenter [1950, pp. 389-394] notes that during its first seven 
years, the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission adopted the following differ­
ent forms of prudent investment: (1) undepreciated original cost; (2) depreciated 
original cost; (3) book cost less book reserve; and (4) invested capital.
Baur [1944, pp. 506-507] argues that prudent investment should be defined 
as original cost less accumulated depreciation due to physical wear and decay 
and to various functional causes such as obsolescence. He criticizes prudent in­
vestment as original cost without deducting depreciation, as follows: “[O]nce a 
corporate investment is made, it must subsequently be fully maintained or it will 
be impaired or dissipated. Such full maintenance consists of ordinary repairs plus 
proper provisions for depreciation as it accrues, both charged regularly to operat­
ing expenses, which are in turn included in rates paid by consumers. If the total 
original cost of plant were included in the rate base [without deducting accumu­
lated depreciation], the company would get a return not only on its own actual or 
unimpaired investment, but also on the amount of consumer contribution pro­
vided in the rates for the purpose of conserving the corporate investment [i.e., 
for the purpose of recovering a portion of the original cost equal to accumulated 
depreciation].”
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excess of its original cost, this higher resale price is the new cost 
that should be substituted for the original cost as the measure of 
the rate base; utilities argue that the rate base should reflect this 
new cost of the property to the present owner, not the original 
owner. The fallacy of this argument, according to Bonbright 
[1945, p. 443], is that consumers of public utility service would 
be compensating investors not only for building plants devoted 
to public service but also for buying plants from other persons 
who have already built them  and who have already been com­
pensated for devoting them to public service:
Once these utility properties have been built and have 
been put into public service, investors who buy them 
later from their original owners are simply taking over 
these former owners’ claims to a return on the capital 
devoted to the public service. We have here essentially 
the same situation that applies when an investor buys 
in the open market some shares of stock in a public 
utility company. Such an investor may have bought this 
stock at a very low price ... or at a very high price.... In 
either case, moreover, the price that he paid may have 
been a rational or reasonable price in the light of then 
current expectations of earnings and dividends. Yet, 
this investor could hardly adduce the high price that he 
may have paid for his stock as an argum ent for public 
utility rates designed to make the stock worth what 
he paid for it. On the other hand, a group of consum­
ers would hardly be allowed to establish the low price 
which a stockholder paid for his stock in support of a 
low rate base.
Bonbright [1945, pp. 445-46] notes that a step up of the rate 
base of productive assets for rate making purposes may be justi­
fied incident to combinations brought about by cash purchases:
In an ordinary cash purchase of a utility property from 
former owners who have been able to exact a price in 
excess of original cost, the new owner can make the 
plausible argum ent that, unless he is granted a rate 
base higher than that which would be accorded to the 
very same property in the hands of the former owners, 
his purchase would impose upon him  a financial loss, 
and this is a potent argum ent for recognition of the 
excess acquisition adjustm ent cost [in the rate base] 
wherever the purchase of the old property by the new 
owner at a price in excess of what would be the old
13
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owner’s rate base was required in the public interest.22
However, Bonbright [1945, p. 446] argues that no step up 
above aboriginal cost of productive assets for rate making pur­
poses is justified for combinations brought about by exchanges 
of shares.
... if the old owners of the properties, instead of selling 
out, have merely pooled their separate interests [in a 
stock-for-stock business combination], thus retaining 
as a group the same assets that they had before the 
consolidation, they are hardly in a position to urge that 
they m ust receive an enhanced rate base because of the 
price that they have been compelled to pay themselves 
in order to induce themselves to consent to the merger. 
Indeed, ... it would seem probable that the transactions 
were of great benefit to the security holders even with­
out reference to any claim for an enhanced rate base.
Bonbright [1945, pp. 445-446] elaborates that com binations 
brought about by exchanges of stock rather than by cash pur­
chases "... lacked the characteristic of an ordinary purchase and 
sale whereby a new owner takes over the properties while the 
old owner takes his cash and gets out.” To Bonbright [1945, p. 
445, italics added], such combinations "... are mere pooling o f  
interests, in which each old stockholder surrenders his stock in 
his separate company in exchange for stock in the enlarged new 
company.”
Interestingly, perhaps the m ost prom inent advocate of ab­
original cost of productive assets for rate making purposes was 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, first as Governor of New York State 
between 1929 and 1933, then as President of the United States 
between 1933 and 1945. According to Tobey [1997, p. 61], Roo-
22According to Bonbright [1945, p. 444], this is an exception where prudent 
investment theory uses a valuation in excess of aboriginal cost for measuring the 
rate base: “This exception applies to situations where a utility property has been 
acquired by new owners as a necessary step in improving the public service, by 
making a better, more efficient unit through the combination of existing utility 
properties. In such a case, if the new owner was compelled to pay more than 
original cost in order to accomplish this socially desirable objective, and if the 
public benefit resulting from the acquisition of the property is more than enough 
to offset the public burden of the higher rate base, the inclusion in the rate base 
of the necessary purchase price seems to me to be in harmony with the ‘prudent 
investment' principle’.”
On the other hand, Priest [1966, p. 319] notes that "... when utility property is 
acquired at less than its original cost, the rate base is measured by the purchaser 
price: "The theory is that it would not be ‘fair’ to impose an original-cost rate base 
on consumers in such circumstances.”
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sevelt sought to further social m odernization and enhance the 
quality of life and living standards of the masses by reducing the 
cost of residential electricity and thereby encouraging its more 
widespread use by homeowners. At a time when perhaps only 
20 percent of private homes in the United States were electri­
fied and electric rates were substantially higher for homeowners 
than for industry, Roosevelt reasoned that the more widespread 
use of electricity in the home would further social moderniza­
tion, reduce poverty, and lessen the drudgery of housekeeping. 
In Roosevelt’s words,
[w]e all know that the great magic of electricity was 
originally used for lighting purposes only. It then spread 
to the factory for industrial uses. Now, however, the 
time has come when electricity should be carried right 
into our very homes so as to lighten the drudgery of 
housekeeping. You and I know that scores of electrical­
ly operated household appliances have been invented.
Of course, the housewives of the State cannot enjoy 
these new inventions as long as the rates for [electric] 
current continue to run as high as they now do.23
Tobey [1997, p. 95] notes that to Roosevelt, “[p]rogressive 
social modernization m eant more than the material improve­
ment of lives. It meant also the moral improvement of life, as a 
m atter of social justice, through technology.” He [Tobey, 1997, 
pp. 59-60] also notes that Roosevelt favored using aboriginal 
cost [although he used the term  cash cost rather than aboriginal 
cost] as a means of reducing the rate base and with it the rates 
utilities charge residential consumers. As Tobey [1997, pp. 59- 
60] notes,
Court cases established that the utilities could use “re­
placement cost” as the basis for determining fair profits 
and rates. This rule perm itted the utilities to bloat their 
capitalization, because the costs of electric plants in 
the future would be higher (if only because of general 
inflation). Roosevelt in turn pushed for statutory de­
term ination of “cash cost” [i.e., aboriginal cost] as the 
basis for determining profit and rates. Profit ought to be 
determined on the basis of the actual cash capitaliza­
tion made by the companies in building their electrical 
plants and distribution system. This, after all, was the 
real debt being paid. Court permission to base profit on
23 Gubernatorial campaign address, Syracuse, New York, October 22, 1930, p.
20, as quoted by Tobey, 1997, p. 61, fn. 43.
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future replacement costs m eant that companies could 
calculate profit on fictitious sums they had not really 
spent. Rates were correspondingly higher.
Thus, using aboriginal cost for measuring the rate base 
was viewed by economic policy makers such as Roosevelt as a 
means of fostering the social and economic policies of enhanc­
ing living standards by reducing utility rates.
RATIONALE OF POOLING ACCOUNTING FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES
Wyatt [1963, p. 22] notes that the term  pooling o f interests 
was used initially to describe transactions involving combina­
tions of closely related utility companies that sought to include 
its assets in the rate base at fair value as of the combination 
date. He [1963, p. 22] also notes that the FPC held that valua­
tion at fair value was im proper and that no new values should 
attach to the properties since such combinations did not involve 
a change in substance. For example, in the 1943 M ontana Power 
Company case,24 the FPC ruled that this combination of related 
companies “.. was not a sale by which one party disposed of an 
interest and another acquired that interest. Just as clearly actual 
legitimate cost cannot be increased by a transaction which does 
not result in parting with property.”
Shortly thereafter, according to Wyatt [1963, p. 22], the 
term  pooling o f interests was used to describe combinations of 
previously unrelated interests that were fused into one company 
to be owned jointly—i.e., stock-for-stock combinations. In the 
1943 Niagara Falls Power case involving such a combination, 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the FPC order that the utility 
should reduce the valuation of its properties to actual legitimate 
costs (except for certain land); the court found that the utility 
was not entitled to have its properties measured at fair value for 
rate making purposes.25
Although the term pooling o f interests was used initially to
24 In the matter of the Montana Power Company, United States Power Com­
mission. Opinions and Decisions of the FPC, vol. 4, Oct. 1, 1943-Dec. 31, 1945, p. 
235 , cited by Wyatt, 1963, p. 23.
25Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 320 U.S. 792; 64 S. Ct. 206; 88 L. Ed. 477; 1943 
U.S. LEXIS 113 @ http://www.lexisnexis.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/hottopics/ 
lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch. However, it is the 1944 Natural Gas 
Hope case that is most often cited as the precedent where the U.S. Supreme Court 
explicitly empowered the FPC and other regulatory authorities to use aboriginal 
cost to measure the rate base. See supra, p. 8.
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describe a stock-for-stock combination transaction, not the ac­
counting treatm ent of that transaction, Wyatt [1963, p. 23] notes 
that the accounting treatm ent "... flowed from the m anner in 
which the Federal Power Commission viewed the transaction....” 
The FPC favored aboriginal cost to measure the rate base—i.e., 
carrying forward the book values of utility assets of the constitu­
ent companies of stock-for-stock business combinations. Clearly, 
carrying forward book values of productive assets under pooling 
of interests accounting is consistent with the concept of ab­
original cost that was being used for rate making purposes. The 
practice of using the same term  pooling o f interests to describe 
the financial reporting for such stock-for-stock combinations 
developed later.
American Institute o f [Certified Public]  Accountants Input: In
1945, the AI[CP]A’s Committee on Public Utility Accounting 
[CPUA, 1945, p. 152] reported to the AI[CP]A Council that the 
FPC has been suggesting the following three propositions in rate 
cases:
(1) No new cost can be created by a reorganization that 
does not result in a m aterial change of individual 
stock ownership.
(2) No new cost can result from a transaction that (a) is 
at less than arm s length or (b) may be regarded as ef­
fecting a pooling of interest.
(3) Where a change in stock ownership takes place w ith­
out any change in corporate entity, a new cost can 
be determined for all the property of the corporation 
on the basis of the aggregate of the sums paid by the 
new stockholders for their holdings; and, further, that 
the cost of individual pieces of property may be deter­
mined by allocation of the cost arrived at for the ag­
gregate of all the property.
The CPUA noted that the Commissions propositions ap­
parently conflict with the then current accounting standards of 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 24, “Accounting for Intangible 
Assets” [ARB 24, 1944], Under ARB 24 [1944, para. 1], stock- 
for-stock combinations were reported at cost consistent with 
purchase accounting, with cost “...determ ined either by the fair 
value of the consideration given or the fair value of the consid­
eration received, whichever was more clearly evident.” Addition­
ally, under ARB 24 [1944, para. 5], the excess of cost over book 
value was allocated to the tangible assets and preferably also to 
intangible net identifiable assets of the acquiree whenever prac­
17
Nurnberg: Objectives of financial reporting, aboriginal cost, and pooling of interests accounting
Published by eGrove, 2012
62 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2012
ticable to do so, with any residual excess recognized as good­
will.26 Such an allocation of fair value results in reporting the 
tangible and intangible assets of the acquiree at acquisition date 
fair value for 100% acquisitions; and partly at fair value and 
partly at book value for less-than-100% acquisitions, consistent 
with the then prevailing parent company theory of consolidated 
financial statements.27 However, the CPUA [1945, p. 151] noted 
that it had not carefully studied the FPC’s propositions and 
would not express an opinion on them.
The AI[CP]A’s Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP)— 
the official U.S. accounting standard setter from 1939 to 1959— 
took up the report of the CPUA. It initially concluded [CAP,
1946, pp. 441-442, italics added] that a pooling of interests, 
which it defined as a combination of two or more interests of 
comparable size, "... may represent another situation in which a 
new basis o f accountability is properly recognized and in which 
assets are most significantly reflected in the accounting records 
at monetary values most nearly representative of their fair value 
at that time.”28 Presumably, this initial conclusion was favored 
by utility companies that were pushing for higher fair value 
valuations all along.
However, Wyatt [1963, p. 24] notes that this initial conclu­
sion of the CAP—i.e., that fair values incident to a new basis of
26 Under ARB 24 [1944, para. 3], limited life intangible assets were amortized 
against earnings, as was limited life goodwill; indefinite life intangible assets and 
goodwill was not amortized but, if impaired, were written down against earned 
surplus (retained earnings), not capital surplus (additional paid-in capital). ARB
24 [1944, para. 6] discouraged but did not prohibit the prior practice of immedi­
ate write off of goodwill against either capital surplus or earned surplus.
27 Under the parent company theory, subsidiary identifiable net assets are re­
ported at acquisition at book value adjusted for the parent company’s share of the 
excess of fair value over book value. The parent company theory was prevailing 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS until superseded by the economic unit theory by FASB State­
ment No. 160, “Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial Statements” 
[SFAS 160, 2007], in ASC Section 810, and by International Financial Account­
ing Standard No. 22, “Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial State­
ments” [IFRS 22, 2007]. Under the economic unit theory, subsidiary identifiable 
net assets are reported at acquisition at fair value.
28 Interestingly, the CAP [1945, p. 441] initially seemed to call for fresh start 
accounting for stock for stock combinations of companies of comparable size, 
whereby all the assets and liabilities of both companies are reported at fair value. 
In an AICPA-sponsored research study that was intended to underlie a new pro­
nouncement on accounting for business combinations by the APB, Wyatt [1963, 
p. 82] also called for fresh start accounting for combinations of companies of 
comparable size, which Wyatt called fair value pooling. However, the APB never 
endorsed fresh start accounting, and the FASB (and the IASB) explicitly reject 
fresh start accounting.
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accountability may be recognized incident to a stock-for-stock 
pooling of interests combination of companies of comparable 
size—was never officially adopted in its (or its successor APB’s) 
pronouncements on generally accepted accounting principles. 
Quite the contrary resulted. Starting with Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 40, “Business Combinations” [ARB 40, 1950, para. 
5], the CAP called for pooling of interests combinations to be 
accounted for by carrying forward historical cost book values 
of net assets of the constituents, not by reporting any net as­
sets at fair value. The CAP continued to prescribe this carrying 
forward of book values for pooling of interests combinations in 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, “Restatement and Revision 
of Accounting Research Bulletins” [ARB-43, 1953, ch. 7, sect. c, 
para. 5], and in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48, “Business 
Combinations” [ARB 48, 1957, para. 9]. Essentially the same 
accounting for pooling of interests combinations was also pre­
scribed by the APB in Opinion No. 16, “Business Combinations” 
[APB 16, 1970, paras. 50-51]; additionally, APB 16 [1970, para. 
12 et passim] describes this carryforward of basis accounting 
for the first time in the authoritative U.S. GAAP literature as the 
pooling o f interests method..29
Securities and Exchange Commission Input: At about the same 
time, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
became a strong supporter of pooling accounting [see, e.g., 
Seligman, 1982, pp. 424-428]. Indeed, on occasion, the SEC 
sometimes m andated pooling accounting for stock-for-stock 
combinations that otherwise might have been subject to pur­
chase accounting under then existing GAAP [see Barr, 1958, pp. 
12-13]. The SEC's strong support for pooling accounting ema­
nated from its aversion to most upward revaluations of plant 
assets and higher depreciation charges based on such upward 
revaluations, especially for rate making purposes.
Zeff [2007, p. 49] elaborates that “[f]rom its founding in 
1934 until the early 1970s, the SEC and especially its Chief Ac­
countant disapproved of most upward revaluations in property,
29 The various tests to qualify for pooling accounting changed as ARB 43 su­
perseded ARB 40, as ARB 48 superseded ARB 43, and as APB 16 superseded ARB 
48. In general, each pronouncement refined the tests but was followed by a relax­
ation of the new tests in practice. See Sapienza, 1962, pp. 268-78; Seligman, 1982, 
pp. 424-428; and Rayburn and Powers, 1991, pp. 160-188. Additionally, more and 
more combinations were structured as exchanges of stock for stock to qualify 
for pooling accounting notwithstanding premiums paid (in shares) to so qualify. 
See Ayers et al., 2002, 6-7; and Lys and Vincent, 1995. Space limitations preclude 
further consideration of these issues.
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plant and equipment as well as depreciation charges based on 
such revaluations.” Zeff [2007, p. 50] credits Robert E. Healy, 
one of the five founding SEC commissioners, as the person who 
effectively cemented the SEC’s aversion to upward revaluations 
of plant assets:
Healy was livid at the asset value write-ups that public 
utilities had been booking.... He complained of ‘write­
ups used to create income or to relieve the income ac­
counts of im portant charges,’ which would be debited 
to the revaluation reserve account that had been cred­
ited with the write-ups.... He was driven to the conclu­
sion that all upward departures from historical cost 
were veritably heinous.
Healy also emphasized the importance of the stewardship 
function of accounting. His views on the objectives of account­
ing are aptly captured in his own words [Healy, 1938, p. 6]:
[T]he purpose of accounting is to accoun t--not to pres­
ent opinions of value.... The value of a corporation’s 
property may be m uch or little --or uncertain. Its cost 
is usually certain. The capital entrusted to the manage­
m ent can usually be ascertained. What has been done 
with that capital can be ascertained through account­
ing. The steward m ust account for the talents entrusted 
to him. Accounting to me means the making of a his­
torical record of financial events. Valuation is a very dif­
ferent matter.
In other words, Healy opposed utility plant asset revalu­
ations [and was a strong advocated historical cost] at a time 
when the SEC viewed the objectives of general purpose financial 
statements to include stewardship and decision usefulness for 
several user groups, including rate making by utility regulators- 
-not just investment decisions by stockholders and creditors.
As Zeff [2007, p. 50] notes, given Healy’s influence over the 
first four SECs chief accountants, his opposition to plant asset 
revaluations and his advocacy of stewardship and historical cost 
valuations led inevitably to SEC support for pooling accounting. 
This position is consistent with the concept of aboriginal cost 
and the stewardship objective of financial reporting.
Accordingly, pooling accounting evolved as the FPC (and 
other regulatory authorities) started to use aboriginal cost and 
prudent investment theory in determining utility rate bases once 
they were perm itted to do so as a result of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in the early 1940s. In the usual situation of rising price
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levels, adherence to aboriginal cost under pooling accounting 
resulted in reporting acquiree productive assets and measuring 
utility rate bases at lower aboriginal cost book values rather 
than at higher fair values. Ceteris paribus, lower rate bases 
resulted in lower utility rates. In turn, lower rates encouraged 
more widespread use of electricity, thereby reducing the drudg­
ery of housework and enhancing living standards and economic 
growth consistent with social and economic objectives of public 
policy makers.
Of course, pooling accounting also became increasingly 
popular by corporate management of unregulated companies 
because it did not involve write ups of carrying values of inven­
tories and limited life tangible and intangible assets that would 
result in reporting higher expenses and lower earnings subse­
quent to the combination date. Although pooling accounting 
provided useful information for rate making decisions by utility 
regulators and facilitated certain economic and social policies, 
it was criticized for providing less useful if not misleading infor­
m ation for investment decisions by stockholders and creditors 
because it understated post-com bination operating expenses 
and overstated post-combination earnings.
Subsequently, most of the accounting literature on pooling 
accounting addressed issues applicable to unregulated compa­
nies, not regulated ones; and m uch of the criticism of pooling 
accounting dealt with its perceived defect of reporting produc­
tive assets at historical cost book values rather than at fair 
values for decision making by stockholders and creditors. Little 
attention was given to other objectives of financial reporting, 
including the benefits of reporting productive assets at historical 
cost book values for rate making and stewardship purposes and 
to facilitate social and economic policies. The next section of 
this paper discusses the changing perceptions of the objectives 
of financial reporting.
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING
Presently, decision usefulness to stockholders and creditors 
is viewed explicitly by accounting standard setters as the basic 
objective of financial reporting; and neutrality is viewed as a de­
sirable quality and an essential component of faithful representa­
tion of accounting information. However, such was not the case 
when pooling accounting was developed in the 1940s. Percep­
tions about the objectives of financial reporting have changed
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over the years, as have what constitute desirable qualities of use­
ful accounting information.
Present Perceptions o f Objectives: In developing financial ac­
counting standards, including SFAS 141 (2001) which prohib­
ited pooling accounting, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) relied in part on its conceptual framework. In 
Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, “Objectives 
of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises” [SFAC-1, 1978, 
paras. 34, 37)), the FASB concludes that the basic objective of 
general purpose external financial reporting is to provide infor­
mation that is useful for investment decisions by stockholders 
and creditors. The FASB largely reconfirmed this basic objec­
tive in its Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8, 
“Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Chapter 1, The 
Objective o f Financial Reporting” [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. OB2], 
jointly developed with the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB).30
In SFAC-1 [1978, paras. 25-26], the FASB reasons that other 
potential users of general purpose external financial reporting 
information—such as suppliers, employees, customers, tax and 
regulators, legislators, labor unions, trade associations, business 
researchers, teachers and students—either have similar infor­
mation needs as investors and creditors and/or have the power 
to obtain whatever information they need. The FASB [1978, 
para. 26] notes, for example, that although tax and regulatory 
authorities often use information in general purpose financial 
statements, both have statutory authority to require the specific 
information they need to fulfill their functions and do not need 
to rely on general purpose external financial reporting inform a­
tion. Similarly, when a financial institution negotiates with an 
enterprise for a large loan or private placement of securities, 
it can often obtain the desired inform ation by making that 
inform ation a condition for completing the transaction. On 
the other hand, individual stockholders and creditors cannot 
require specific information if not provided in general purpose 
financial statements. SFAC-8 [2010a, para. OB5] reasons simi­
30 The emphases and conclusions of SFAC-1 differ somewhat from those of 
SFAC-8, and the FASB relied on SFAC-1, not SFAC-8, when it developed SFAS 
141 (2001). Additionally, SFAC-8 is more succinct than SFAC-1 in addressing the 
information needs of regulators, public policy makers, and other users. For ex­
ample, SFAC-8 discusses the information needs of regulators for maintaining fi­
nancial stability, not for utility rate making. A word search of SFAC-8 failed to find 
a single reference to utility, utilities, regulated, or rate making.
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larly that "[m]any existing and potential investors, lenders, and 
o ther creditors cannot require reporting entities to provide 
information directly to them and must rely on general purpose 
financial reports As a result, SFAC-8 [2010a, para. OB5] 
follows SFAC-1 and concludes that potential investors, lenders, 
and other creditors "... are the prim ary users to whom general 
purpose financial reports are directed.”31
Importantly, SFAC-1 (as reconfirmed by SFAC-8) was the 
culmination of the FASB's extensive deliberations in the 1970s, 
when individual and institutional stockholders and creditors 
(and their advisors) were becoming increasingly prom inent if 
not the dom inant user group among FASB constituents.32 Pool­
ing accounting evolved long before the FASB developed its con­
ceptual framework.
It is true that regulators may have the statutory authority to 
require specific information they need to fulfill their functions 
and do not need to rely on external financial reporting inform a­
tion. However, regulators often choose not to exercise such au­
thority, and to rely on information in general purpose financial 
statements instead. For example, Quint [1994, p. 27] notes that 
utility regulators often insist on making decisions based on in­
formation in general purpose financial statem ents.33 Similarly, in
31 The FASB [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. BC1.23] also reasons that expanding the 
objective of financial reporting to provide information to regulators would de­
prive investors and creditors of information that they need; the only way to avoid 
conflicts would be to eliminate or deemphasize the objective of providing infor­
mation to investors and creditors. It [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. BC1.23] concludes that 
"... eliminating that objective would be inconsistent with its basic mission, which 
is to serve the information needs of participants in capital markets.”
32 The predecessor to the FASB, the APB, which functioned between 1959 
and 1973, briefly specified a similar decision usefulness objective of financial 
accounting, again primarily for stockholders and creditors, but it also noted a 
stewardship objective of financial accounting. In Concepts Statement No. 4, "Basic 
Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises,” the APB [1970, para. 73, italics added] notes that the basic purpose 
of financial accounting and financial statements "... is to provide quantitative in­
formation about a business enterprise that is useful to statement users, particu­
larly owners and creditors, in making economic decisions. This purpose includes 
providing information that can be used in evaluating management’s effectiveness 
in fulfilling its stewardship and other managerial responsibilities.” See also Most, 
1977, pp. 107-120. The predecessor to the APB, the CAP, which functioned be­
tween 1939 and 1959 when pooling accounting was developed, did not explicitly 
address the basic objectives of financial accounting in a comparable manner.
33Quint [1994, p. 27] notes that in the Entergy Services case, the FERC per­
mitted purchase accounting for regulatory purposes notwithstanding its prefer­
ence for pooling accounting in order to avoid "... the undesirable effects that may 
result from potentially having different financial statements presented for regula­
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assessing the adequacy of bank regulatory capital, U.S. federal 
regulatory authorities insist on using the same mark-to-market 
fair value accounting rules for loan portfolios that are used in 
general purpose financial statements under current U.S. GAAP.34 
Accordingly, it is somewhat simplistic (if not disingenuous) for 
the FASB and IASB to dismiss the needs of regulators for finan­
cial statem ent information.
Changing Perceptions o f Objectives: Hendriksen [1970, p. 2] notes 
that the objectives of financial reporting have changed over 
time as one or more user groups have dom inant influence over 
financial accounting standard setters. He [1970, pp. 102-103] 
notes that for many years [including the years in which pool­
ing accounting was developed], another approach to standard 
setting was to assume that the basic objective of general pur­
pose financial reporting is to provide information for a set of 
unknown users with multiple needs. At least before the FASB 
issued SCAC-1 in 1978 if not now, many accountants and finan­
cial report users concurred that the basic objective of financial 
accounting is broader in scope than as enum erated in SFAC-1 
and reconfirmed in SFAC-8—i.e., to serve multiple users, not 
just stockholders and creditors.
tory and general financial purposes.” See also 64 FERC 61, 001, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair; 
Vicky A. Bailey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr., Entergy Services, Inc. v. and Gulf States 
Utilities Company, Docket Nos. EC92-21-001, EC92-21-002, ER92-806-001and 
ER92-806-002, Issued July 1, 1993.
34According to Berleau [2008, p. A15], the FASB's mark-to-market fair value 
accounting rules are exacerbating the 2007 financial crisis: “Markets for individ­
ual loans are still much thinner than for stocks and bonds. The market for securi­
tized loans with unique features is even thinner, and a disruptive event can cause 
these markets to virtually disappear. As a result, if a highly leveraged bank sells 
a mortgage-backed security at a steep discount, this becomes the ‘market price’.” 
Berleau [2008, p. A15] continues that “[a] single bank’s fire sale can decrease the 
[total] ‘regulatory capital’ [of the banking industry under U.S. GAAP, whereup] 
"... banks are forced to sell billions of dollars of assets to “clean up their balance 
sheets .... creating a “downward spiral of prices, marking down — selling — mark­
ing down again.” Representatives of the banking industry argue that the FASB’s 
mark-to-market fair value accounting rules result in unrealistic writedowns on 
loans that banks intend to hold to maturity, and should be replaced by other valu­
ation rules, as least for measuring regulatory capital. See also Gorton, 2008, pp. 
64-65; and Pinedo and Beck, 2008, pp. 6-8. However, federal regulatory authori­
ties presumably maintain that using different methods is not politically expedient. 
Given the 2007 financial crisis and the subsequent call for transparency in finan­
cial reporting by banks, regulators presumably cannot mandate smaller loan loss 
provisions for regulatory purposes than for GAAP purposes; and the FASB claims 
that only the GAAP provisions are representationally faithful.
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For example, in a 1961 AICPA-sponsored research study 
that was intended originally to underlie the development of 
accounting standards by the then newly established APB, Uni­
versity of California—Berkeley professor and AICPA Director of 
Accounting Research Maurice Moonitz [1961, pp. 23-27, italics 
added] argued that the basic objective of financial reporting 
is decision usefulness for many different user groups, not just 
for stockholders and creditors. Moonitz [1961, pp. 4-5, italics 
added] notes that
... anyone who stresses “usefulness” as a criterion, in 
accounting or elsewhere, m ust answer the two pointed 
questions--useful to whom? and for what purpose? And 
herein lies the danger. We could easily be trapped into 
defining accounting and form ulating its postulates, 
principles, and rules in terms of some special inter­
est, such as the business community, or the regulatory 
agencies, or investors, or tax collectors. But accounting 
has been used in the affairs of private business, regu­
lated and unregulated, of profit motivated enterprises 
as well as nonprofit ones, of illegal as well as legal en­
terprises, of socially undesirable as well as desirable 
entities, of organizations in socialist, fascist, or commu­
nist states as well as those in free enterprise societies.
We cannot proceed on the premise that accounting is the 
monopoly o f any one group, whether that group is con­
cerned mainly with the development of the accounting 
process or with its end-product in the form of financial 
statements and reports.
Thus, Moonitz [1961] defined the objectives of general 
purpose financial reporting more broadly than SFAC-1 [1978] 
and SFAC-8 [2010a] to provide information needed not only for 
investment and credit decisions by stockholders and creditors, 
but for other purposes and other users, including rate making 
by public utility regulators and fostering social and economic 
policies by public policy makers.35
35 To some extent, of course, rate making by regulatory authorities and foster­
ing social and economic policies are interrelated. For example, in setting rates, 
Leventhal [1965, p. 1017] notes that some utility regulators consider the quality 
of the utility service, which "... should include an awareness of the needs of the 
public as they change and grow, conscientious effort to put technological research 
and developments to the service of the community, and responsiveness to the 
community’s plans and programs.” Additionally, Breyer and MacAvoy [1973, pp. 
949-950] note that regulating utility rates might be motivated not only to curb mo­
nopoly power but to redistribute income from producers to consumers. Interest­
ingly, Breyer has been an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court since 1994.
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When Moonitz was developing his ideas in the 1940s, 1950s 
and early 1960s, many practicing and academic accountants 
concurred with this broader view of the objective of general pur­
pose financial reporting including, no doubt, some of the mem­
bers of the CAP under which pooling accounting evolved into 
GAAP, as well as some members of the APB, and perhaps even 
some of the early members of the FASB;36 many may still do. 
Importantly, pooling accounting developed in part to satisfy the 
information needs of utility regulators for rate making purposes 
and public policy makers for fostering social and economic 
policies in an era when many accountants, report users, and 
standard setters viewed the basic objective of general purpose 
financial reporting to include providing information for a set of 
unknown users with multiple needs.
Stewardship as Another Objective: Additionally, prior to SFAC- 
1 [1978] if not now, many Anglo-American accountants (and 
perhaps even more non-Anglo-American accountants) viewed 
stewardship (or accountability) as well as decision usefulness 
as im portant objectives of general purpose financial reporting. 
For example, Oldroyd and Miller [2011, p. 11] note that besides 
providing information that is useful for investment decisions by 
stockholders and creditors, a basic objective of accounting is to 
facilitate trade and investment by attesting to property rights 
and obligations, so that property owners have evidence to en­
force their rights in courts of law:
Stewardship fits into the equation through the ability of 
accounts to communicate events at a distance.... In the 
modern era, the separation of ownership from manage­
m ent is not the m ain reason for the creation of agency 
relationships and accounts; rather, it is the need of 
shareholders to evaluate operations at a distance.... De­
cision usefulness, for its part, has existed as an adjunct 
to stewardship accounting for most of its history.
SFAC-1 [1978, para. 50] notes that “[f]inancia l reporting 
should provide information about how management of an enter­
On the other hand, some commentators criticized regulatory authorities for 
using accounting requirements to foster social and economic goals. For example, 
Brundage [1950, p. 388, italics added] notes that "... one of the most serious com ­
plaints of the accounting profession—that the regulatory commissions, on occa­
sion, have used accounting requirements as a means for accomplishing social objec­
tives, although in so doing they may have departed from what was considered the 
best accounting practice at the time.”
36See, e.g., Paton and Littleton, 1940, pp. 2-3; and May, 1943, pp. 254-65.
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prise has discharged its stewardship responsibility to owners for 
the use of enterprise resources entrusted to it.” It [1978, para. 
50] notes that enterprise management
... is periodically accountable to the owners not only 
for the custody and safekeeping of enterprise resources 
but also for their efficient and profitable use and for 
protecting them to the extent possible from unfavor­
able economic impacts of factors in the economy such 
as inflation or deflation and technological and social 
changes.
SFAS-1 goes on to note that a central question for report 
users is how an enterprise and its owners are faring, and that 
the stewardship function of financial reporting helps answer 
this question. In SFAC 1 [1978], however, the FASB downplays 
stewardship relative to decision usefulness as a basic objective of 
general purpose financial statem ents.37
SFAC-8 [2010, para. B1.27] notes more succinctly that 
because decision usefulness is the basic objective of financial 
reporting, there is no need for the conceptual framework to have 
separate sections on decision usefulness for credit and invest­
ment decisions versus decision usefulness for assessing manage­
ment stewardship: “Both are im portant for making decisions 
about providing resources to an entity, and information about 
stewardship also is im portant for resource providers who have 
the ability to vote on, or otherwise influence, management’s ac­
tions.” In effect, SFAC-8 claims that stewardship is an aspect of 
decision usefulness for investment decision making, despite the 
widespread view heretofore that stewardship differs from deci­
sion usefulness. Like SFAC 1 [1978] and prior APB pronounce­
ments, therefore, SFAC-8 [2010] downplays stewardship relative 
to decision usefulness as a basic objective of general purpose 
financial statements.38 Moreover, to the extent that they consid­
ered stewardship, the FASB (and the APB) consider stewardship 
principally to stockholders and creditors, not to other interested 
parties, such as regulators and public policy makers.
37 The APB, the predecessor to the FASB, also downplays stewardship relative 
to decision usefulness as a basic objective of general purpose financial statements, 
as noted above.
38SFAC-8 [2010a, para. BC1.28] notes that the FASB decided not to use the 
term stewardship in SFAC-8 "... because there would be difficulties in translating 
it [stewardship] into other languages. Instead, the Board described what steward­
ship encapsulates. Accordingly, the objective of financial reporting acknowledges 
that users make resource allocation decisions as well as decisions as to whether 
management has made efficient and effective use of the resources provided.”
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Interestingly, the E uropean  Financial R eporting Advi­
sory Group [EFRAG, 2007], the [British] Accounting Standards 
Board, and a num ber of other European accounting standard- 
setters argue that stewardship (or accountability) should be 
viewed as a separate basic objective of financial reporting. The 
EFRAG [2007, para. 3.1] elaborates that "... the stewardship 
objective is about assessing m anagem ents competence and in­
tegrity including the success of their strategy in managing the 
business,” and that an assessment of stewardship "... was origi­
nally the prim ary objective of financial reporting under agency 
theory and is just as relevant today....” The EFRAG [2007, para. 
7.1] notes that most [non-Anglo-American] respondents to their 
survey view stewardship [to stockholders] as a separate basic 
objective of financial reporting.39
Importantly, pooling accounting developed in an era when 
many accountants and report users viewed stewardship as a 
separate basic objective of financial reporting, if not the basic 
objective; and where some commentators viewed stewardship 
not just to stockholders and creditors but also to other interest­
ed parties, such as regulatory authorities and public policy mak­
ers. For example, Ladd [1963, p. ix] notes that "... accounting 
has the vital social role of passing on to the public, information 
about the extent and uses of corporate powers.” More recently, 
Rasche and Esser [2006, p. 252] define accountability more 
broadly as
... the readiness or preparedness of an organization 
to give an explanation and a justification to relevant 
stakeholders for its judgments, intentions, acts, and 
omissions when appropriately called upon to do so.... 
Accountability thus entails a mechanism of effective 
control by customers, citizens, and beneficiaries allow­
ing an evaluation of the private or public good.
39EFRAG [2007, para. 5.2] notes that some respondents view stewardship 
more broadly than accountability to also include the concept of responsibility, 
that stewardship connotes that management should be striving to act in the best 
interests of shareholders under current and future circumstances, whereas ac­
countability connotes a backward looking and narrower concept than steward­
ship. However, most respondents to the Exposure Draft to SFAC-8 treat steward­
ship and accountability as interchangeable. EFRAG [2007, para. 5.2-5.5] favors 
replacing stewardship with accountability because accountability is the true rea­
son for producing financial reports -  i.e., to provide an account to the owners. 
Additionally, the term stewardship is old fashioned and for some only addresses 
information on corporate governance issues; and accountability is more easily 
translated to other languages than stewardship.
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Others [e.g., Briloff, 2002; and Briloff and Briloff, 2010] 
concur that an im portant objective of financial reporting is to 
hold the management of large publicly owned corporations ac­
countable to society, especially when there is a separation of 
ownership (i.e., stockholders) and control (i.e., management).40
Pooling accounting developed in part to enable utility m an­
agement to demonstrate its stewardship over the aboriginal cost 
of utility assets, not only to stockholders and creditors, bu t also 
to utility regulators, the courts, and public policy makers that 
were increasingly favoring aboriginal cost and prudent invest­
ment theory for rate making purposes.
Economic Policy as Another Objective: Presently, both the FASB 
and the IASB adhere to the quality of neutrality as an essential 
component of faithful representation of accounting information. 
For example, in Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts No.
8, “Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Chapter
3, Qualitative Characteristics o f Useful Financial Information” 
[SFAC-8 [2010b, para. BC3.29], the FASB notes that in develop­
ing financial accounting standards, it
... does not attem pt to encourage or predict specific 
actions of users. If financial information is biased in a 
way that encourages users to take or avoid predeter­
mined actions, that information is not neutral.
The FASB explains more fully in Concepts Statement No. 2, 
“Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Inform ation” [SFAC-
2, 1980, paras. 98-100], that in developing accounting standards, 
its prim ary concern is the relevance and reliability of the result­
ing information, and that the resulting information should be 
free from bias towards a predeterm ined result.
When it develops new accounting standards, the FASB dis­
misses consideration of the effects of accounting standards on 
particular parties or particular behavior, including national eco­
nomic and social policy, notwithstanding its understanding that 
accounting standards affect behavior. For example, in SFAC-8 
[2010a, para. BC1.23], the FASB explicitly rejects suggestions 
that maintaining financial stability in national capital markets 
is a proper objective of financial reporting; it concludes that
40 However, Briloff [1967] and Briloff and Briloff, 2010] do not believe that 
pooling accounting facilitates stewardship, at least to stockholders and creditors. 
They are strong advocates of the purchase (or acquisition) method and strong 
critics of the pooling method.
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such an objective would be inconsistent with its basic mission to 
serve the information needs of capital market participants.
However, as early as 1940, various commentators note that 
financial accounting information is the basis for significant deci­
sions and policies in the economic, social, and political realm as 
well as in business affairs. For example, Greer [1940, p. v, italics 
added] notes that accounting is
... an im portant medium for the public expression of 
the im portant facts about our vast and complex com­
mercial and industrial society. Where the accountant 
once was concerned merely with assisting the owners 
of a business to evaluate its operations in money terms, 
he now must recognize a broad social responsibility. His 
findings, and the m anner in which he sets them forth, 
have become the basis for significant decisions and poli­
cies, not only in business affairs, but in economic, social, 
and political matters.....
Similarly, Paton and Littleton [1940, pp. 2-3, italics added] 
note that
[g]reat corporations are quasi-public institutions for 
social cooperation .... [T]hey have a duty to government 
and to a price conscious public.... [T]he public aspects 
o f corporations call for recognition by corporate man­
agement o f public responsibilities; acceptance of such 
responsibilities calls for the development and use of 
corporate accounting standards.
One recent manifestation of the economic, social, and po­
litical role of accounting is the Chinese Accounting Standards 
Board (CASB), which opted to develop its own accounting 
standard on business combinations, [Chinese] Accounting Stan­
dards for Enterprises No. 20, "Business Combinations" [CAS-20, 
2006], rather than adopt IFRS-3 (2004) verbatim. According 
to Baker et al.[2010, pp. 112, 114], the capital markets orienta­
tion of the IASB [and the FASB] largely ignores the existence of 
mergers [of related companies]; under IFRS [and U.S. GAAP], 
business combinations are viewed mainly as acquisitions result­
ing from arm ’s length bargaining between unrelated parties.41 
In contrast, the political and economic focus of the Chinese 
standards setters emphasizes the existence of both mergers of 
related companies and acquisitions of unrelated companies; and
41 Almost as an aside, however, both the IASB [IFRS-3, paras. B1-B4] and the 
FASB [SFAS 141(R), paras. D8-D13] note that combinations of companies under 
common control remain subject to pooling accounting.
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the need to have different methods of accounting for these dif­
ferent types of combination transactions. Baker et al.[2010, p. 
112] contend that
Chinese standard setters sought to comply with IFRS 
insofar as those standards do not adversely affect eco­
nomic development.... [but] ... apparently concluded 
that the IASB standard ... could have an adverse impact 
upon the industrial reorganization process taking place 
in China.
Consequently, Baker et al. [2010, p. 112] conclude that Chinese 
standard setters view the fundamental objectives of financial 
reporting somewhat differently than the IASB [and the FASB] 
because they consider the effect of accounting standards on eco­
nomic development.
Pooling accounting developed in the United States in part to 
foster certain social and economic policies long before neutral­
ity was ensconced by accounting standard setters as a desirable 
qualitative characteristic of financial accounting information. 
Some advocates of pooling accounting argue that by adhering 
to aboriginal cost valuations of plant assets following stock-for- 
stock combinations of utilities, pooling accounting results in 
lower utility rate bases. In turn, the lower rate bases result in 
lower utility rates, which encourages greater use of electricity, 
enhances living standards, and fosters economic growth.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Through the years, pooling accounting was criticized as 
contrary to the decision usefulness objective of financial report­
ing and potentially misleading to stockholders and creditors 
in making investment decisions. Critics of pooling accounting 
argued that it does not provide decision useful information to 
stockholders and creditors because it grossly understates (1) the 
cost of stock-for-stock combinations; (2) the carrying values of 
the net assets of the acquiree; and (3) the expense incident to us­
ing acquiree net assets subsequent to the combination date.
From a historical perspective, however, there were some 
very good reasons for requiring or at least permitting pooling 
accounting for stock-for-stock business com binations when 
the method was developed in the 1940s. At that time, the basic 
objectives of financial accounting were viewed more broadly to 
include stewardship and decision usefulness for multiple users, 
including public utility regulators and public policy makers, not 
just stockholders and creditors. Pooling accounting developed
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in part to satisfy the information needs of public utility regula­
tors and public policy makers; it was a response to regulators' 
increasing use of aboriginal cost to measure the utility rate base 
for utility combinations, once they were permitted to do so as a 
result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early 1940s. Lower 
utility rates resulted when utility rate bases were measured at 
aboriginal costs under pooling accounting rather than at fair 
values under purchase accounting. In turn, lower utility rates 
facilitated the attainm ent of certain social and economic goals; 
it encouraged more widespread use of electricity, lessened the 
drudgery of housework, and enhanced living standards and eco­
nomic growth.
ADDENDUM
Recent Combinations of Health Care Organizations
Mathews (2012a) reports rising medical prices associated 
with increasing numbers of hospital systems combining with 
private physician practices. Although hospital representatives 
contend that the combinations make health care more efficient, 
rising prices result because insurance companies pay for medi­
cal services at hospital systems rates that are a lot higher than 
the rates for the same services performed at private medical 
practice facilities. For some procedures, such as imaging scans, 
insurance companies reimburse as hospital outpatient proce­
dures rather than as practice office procedures. According to 
Mathews (2012a), the same procedure, sometimes performed at 
the same location, may double in price once a hospital system 
acquires the medical practice. Mathews (2012b) also reports 
that several states attorney-generals are investigating whether 
mergers of hospitals and doctor groups are pushing up prices.
Of course, this increase in third-party reim bursem ent rates 
is due to many other factors. According to Mathews (2012b), the 
prim ary factor may be the increased bargaining power of medi­
cal service providers due to the reduced competition by combin­
ing previously competing hospitals and private physician prac­
tices. Additionally—and unm entioned by Mathews—the increase 
in reimbursement rates may also be an artifact of the financial 
accounting for these combinations. Third-party reimbursement 
rates suppose to reimburse medical providers for the cost of 
providing services, including depreciation of medical facilities 
and equipment; and depreciation increases due to the increase 
in the depreciation base by using +purchase (or acquisition) 
m ethod to record these combinations when fair value exceeds
32
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
Nurnberg, Pooling 77
aboriginal cost of these facilities and equipment. To that extent, 
third-party providers may push for aboriginal cost valuations 
of acquired facilities and equipment under the pooling method, 
at least for third-party reim bursem ent rate making purposes. 
To date, however, this accounting artifact issue has not been 
reported to be under active consideration by either third-party 
providers or states attorneys-general.
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